摘要
Thispaperadoptstherealoptionsapproachtostudythedecision-makingofcorporateendogenousbankruptcyanddebtreorganizationinarisk-neutralframework,whileunderstandingcorporatebankruptcyanddebtreorganizationastheoptionsheldbyequityholdersandthecreditor.Afterobtainingthevaluesofcontingentclaimsonthecorporateassets,thepaperanalyzesthebankruptcydecisionsofdifferentleveredcorporate.Withstandarddebtcontractandunderabsolutepriorityrule,thebankruptcytimesmaximizingtheequityvaluearenotconsistentwiththosemaximizingthecorporatevalue:thehighleveredcorporatewillinefficientlybankruptearlywhilethelowleveredcorporatewillinefficientlybankruptlate.Ifdebtreorganizationorcreditorconcessionisn'tallowed,liquidationoftenleadstothelossinvalue.Butifstrategicdefaultordeviationfromabsolutepriorityruleisallowed,thedecisionmaximizingtheequityvaluewillbeconsistentwiththatmaximizingthecorporatevalue.Debtreorganizationhassignificanteconomicimplication:forhighleveredcorporateorlowleveredcorporate,withdebtreorganizationordeviationoftheabsolutepriorityrulepermitted,postponedorhastenedbankruptcycanbeavoided,hence,thebankruptcytriggerchosenbyequityholderstomaximizetheequityvalueisefficientdecisionwithoutvaluelosses.
出版日期
2004年01月11日（中国期刊网平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）
