Nash Equilibrium with Noncompact and Nonconvex Strategic Set

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摘要 Inthenoncooperativegame,whenconsideringtheexistenceofsolutiontoclassicalNashequilibrium,thereisahypothesis,foreachplayerhe(orshe)hasanonemptycompactconvexstrategicsetandtheutilityfunctioniscontinuous.Inthispaper,underthesystematicequilibriumview,anewexistenceresultofsolutiontoNashequilibriumisobtainedbyemployingthecompletenessofstrategicspaceandsemicontinuityofutilityfunctioninsteadofcorrespondingcompactnessandconvexityandcontinuity.
机构地区 不详
出版日期 2004年04月14日(中国期刊网平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)