摘要
Memberenterprisesengagedinavirtualenterprisearepronetoshirkbothproductiveeffortsandrisksbecausetheireffortsareunobservabletoanyothermemberenterprises.Howtodesignarevenuesharingcontracttopreventthememberenterprisesfromfreeridingisoneofthemostimportantissuestobeconsideredtocutdownrisksthatvirtualenterprisesmaymeet.Basedontheworkofprofitsharinginpartnershipsandtheresearchonrevenuesharinginsupplychainsandjointventures,weproposeamodeloftherevenuesharingcontractaimedatcoordinatingavirtualenterprisecomposedofnrisk-aversememberenterpriseswhereeverymemberenterpriseperformsdifferenttasksandcontributesdistinctcoreresources.Wecharacterizetheoptimalproductiveefforts,risk-takenandincentiveintensityintherevenuesharingcontract,andindicatethatimprovingtheevaluationprecisionofproductiveeffortsandselectingweaklyrisk-aversememberenterpriseswithclosepowerarethekeyfactorstothesuccessofVEs.
出版日期
2006年01月11日（中国期刊网平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）
