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简介：Inthispaper,agamemodelcomposedofthreesubjects—government,manufacturerandconsumerhasbeenbuiltbyusingEvolutionaryGameTheoryonthebasisofanalyzingthetrilateralgamestrategyofwastemobilereversesupplychainbasedonECP;anevolutionaryequilibriummodelistobesoughtforbyutilizingthereplicationdynamicdifferentialequationmethod;andthetrilateralgamestrategy’srevolutionarytrendandconsistencyhavebeenanalyzedbymeansofSDsimulationmethodwhengovernmentimplementsthestaticordynamicrewardandpunishmentstrategy.Thefindingresultsrevealthat,underthestaticrewardandpunishmentstrategy,therevolutionaryprocessoftrilateralgamestrategyisalwaysunstablewhethertheinitialbehaviorstrategyisunitaryormixed.Therefore,itismorereasonableforthegovernmenttoadoptthestrategyofdynamicrewardandpunishment,anditisalsostableandreciprocalforallthestakeholderswhenimplementingthisstrategy.

简介：Forthetransientbehaviorofasemiconductordevice,themodifiedmethodofcharacteristicswithalternating-directionfiniteelementproceduresfornonrectangularregionisputforward.Sometechniques,suchascalculusofvariations,isoparametrictransformation，patchapproximation,operator-splitting,characteristicmethod,symmetricalreflection,energymethod,negativenormestimateandapriorestimatesandtechniques,areemployed.Inthenonrectangularregioncase,optimalorderestimatesinL^2normarederivedfortheerrorintheapproximationsolution.Thusthewell-knowntheoreticalproblemhasbeenthoroughlyandcompletelysolved.

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