简介：在这份报纸，我们考虑从消费者收集使用的产品并且生产重新生产的产品的生产仅仅新的产品和一个制造商的由一个原来的制造商(OM)组成的一个单个时期的模型。OM和制造商在产品市场竞争。我们作为一个工具检验政府津贴的效果支持重新生产的活动。在里面特别地，我们认为三是津贴选择：到制造商，到消费者的津贴，和津贴的津贴由制造商和消费者分享了。我们发现制造商或消费者上的政府津贴的介绍总是增加重新生产的活动。我们也发现因为到制造商的津贴导致重新生产的产品的更低的价格，到制造商的那津贴是最好的津贴选择，因此导致更高级的消费者剩余。

简介：Thispaperconsidersaworst-caseinvestmentoptimizationproblemwithdelayforafundmanagerwhoisinacrash-threatenedfinancialmarket.Drivenbyexistingofcapitalinflow/outflowrelatedtohistoryperformance,weinvestigatetheoptimalinvestmentstrategiesundertheworst-casescenarioandthestochasticcontrolframeworkwithdelay.Thefinancialmarketisassumedtobeeitherinanormalstate(crash-free)orinacrashstate.InthenormalstatethepricesofriskyassetsbehaveasgeometricBrownianmotion,andinthecrashstatethepricesofriskyassetssuddenlydropbyacertainrelativeamount,whichinducestoadroppingofthetotalwealthrelativetothatofcrash-freestate.Weobtaintheordinarydifferentialequationssatisfiedbytheoptimalinvestmentstrategiesandtheoptimalvaluefunctionsunderthepowerandexponentialutilities,respectively.Finally,anumericalsimulationisprovidedtoillustratethesensitivityoftheoptimalstrategieswithrespectivetothemodelparameters.

简介：

简介：

简介：这份报纸在允许市场制造者在一张股票的价值上知道一些信息的连续时间在内部交易调查线性策略平衡。由过滤理论的使用，作者证明在一个垄断市场，在那里存在在一种关上的形式的紧张的线性策略的唯一的平衡，以便内部的人能做积极利润并且在它，所有股票的价值的私人信息被释放；并且越多精确股票的价值的信息由市场制造者观察了，积极利润被内部的人成为越少，并且甚至去零。然而，如果他们两个都采用紧张的线性策略，在在二个内部的人之间的一个Cournot比赛市场没有纳什平衡。

简介：

简介：

简介：

简介：Thispaperanalyzesmanufacturers’wholesalepricedecisionsandtheevolutionarilystablestrategiesoftheretailers’marketingbehaviorinduopolysupplychains,whereeachchainconsistsofonemanufacturerandmanyretailers.Eachretailerchoosesoneoftwomarketingstrategies:socialresponsibilityornon-socialresponsibility(i.e.,afirmonlycaresaboutthebenefitsofitsshareholders).Weidentifytheconditionsunderwhichastrategyprofileisevolutionarilystable.Furthermore,weinvestigatethemanufacturers’wholesalepricesandfindthefollowing:(i)theretailer’ssocialresponsibilitydecreasestheunitwholesaleprice;(ii)whenthedegreeoftheretailer’ssocialresponsibilityismedium,thesocialresponsibilityoftheretailerinasupplychainincreasestheprofitoftheretailer’sownmanufactureranddecreasestheprofitoftherival’smanufacturer;otherwise,itdecreasestheprofitsofthetwomanufacturers;and(iii)wheneachretailerexhibitsitssocialresponsibilitymoderately,atriple-winsituationcanbeachieved.

简介：一个热电源系统的效率能被电产生和电消费的操作的工艺的前进改进，这广泛地被认出了。聪明的米启用在顾客和电产生系统之间的双向通讯。电产生系统使用价格刺激(即在高峰时期的更高的价格和在离峰的时期的更低的价格)在聪明的格子环境下面从山峰转移要求的部分到离峰的时期。给在每个时期的那燃料消费是严格地增加的事实电源输出的凸的功能，我们求婚二时期并且多时期定价策略，和研究减少燃料消费上的不同定价策略的效果。

简介：

简介：TraditionalevaluationtechniquesformutualfundsarebasedonCAPMorAPT.ProposeanewmeasurebenefitingfromValueatRiskisproposedinthispaper.WeshowhowtoapplytheVARdynamicstotheevaluationofmutualfunds.Meanwhile,weappliedtheideatothedesignofdynamicportfolioconstructionstrategies.Asfortheportfolioweightadjusting,thispaperisfocusedontheoptimaladjustingstrategieswithcosthappensandthoseonconcretetimepoints.

简介：Thepaperstudieschannelchoicedecisionsinamulti-channelsupplychainunderastrategywherethereisanex-antecommitmentmadeontheretailpricemarkup.Themarketdemandisuncertainanddependentonthepriceandsalesefforts.Theresultsshowthatinanychannelstructure,whenmakingorderdecisionstheretaileronlyexaminesthepriceratioandthefluctuationsizeofrandomdemand,ratherthanthechannelcostandtheretailer’smarketingefficiency.Whentheretailpricerises,themanufactureriswillingtoincreaseinventoryquantityfordirectsales,becausethemanufacturer’sprofitmarginishigherindirectchannel.Theincreaseindemandfluctuationonlyaffectsthedegreeofchannelpreferencebutdoesn’tchangethemanufacturer’schannelchoice.Nomatterinwhichlevelthepriceratiois,whenthesalesefficiencyofretailchannelisnothighorthedemandproportionofdirectchannelislow,themanufacturerandtheretailerwillbebothapttochooseadual-channelstructure.Thenaddingadirectchannelbecomesamarketingstrategy,ratherthanacompetitoroftheretailchannel,andhelpsthesupplychainwinmoremarketdemand.

简介：Inthispaper,regulatoryandoptimumprogrammingmodelhasbeenadopted.Consideringthecostsofemissionreduction,supervisionandpenalty,wewentallouttoanalyzetheoptimaldecisionofcostefficiencyofregulatorswhenimplementingthesethreepolicyinstruments:carbonemissionstandards,carbonemissiontradingpermissions,andcarbontaxesaswell.Itsresulthasindicated:Instrictaccordancewithcontroltargetoftotalcarbonemissions,regulatorsarewillingtorendersocialandeconomiccostabletoachievethegoalofoptimalcostefficiencybyregulatingcarbonemissionstandardsandsupervisingmarginalcostcausedbyvariationsintheprobability;fortunately,undertheconditionsoflowsupervisorycostandcertaincriteriawhichismet,theimplementationofcarbonemissiontradingpermissionscouldprovidesocialandeconomiccostwithopportunitiestorealizethatobjective;throughcomparativeanalysis,carbonemissiontradingpermissionshavetheadvantagesofhigherefficiencythancarbonemissionstandardsonthepremiseofincompleteinformation.Duringtheimplementationofcarbontaxesstrategy,whenthereexistsuncertaintyinformationintheenterprisesreductionbehaviors,theconditionwhichenterprisescanfullycomplywithisthetaxratelevelisnothigherthanmarginalpenaltyfunction;thetaxratelevelofenterprisesperfectcomplianceoughtnottobelowerthanthedivisionofmarginalpenaltycostandmarginalsupervisorycost.Theoptimalstrategyofenterprisesimperfectcomplianceisthatregulatorsvaryingthemarginalcostofemissionstandardsisequaltovaryingthatofsupervisoryprobability.

简介：基于比赛理论和主要代理人的理论，这篇论文集中于当道德的危险存在时，怎么在供应链控制产品质量和设计质量合同。我们安装了供应商，买主期望利润函数模型，供应商在使生产过程成为投资级的决定并且决定产品质量预防水平，而买主做优秀评估决定并且决定产品质量检查水平。有减少投资水平的道德的危险的供应商可以在生产过程缺乏投资；因此，买主将付信息租金到incentivize改进投资水平的供应商。买主创造夸大产品质量有缺陷者率的道德的危险，在检查的overinvest可以处理。我们使用最佳的条件解决供应商外部失败的第一最好的优秀检查水平，内部惩罚，和分配比率花费了的第一最好的投资水平，产品质量预防水平，和买主。我们也进行显示出下列的模拟测试：当供应商改进它的投资水平时，它的产品质量预防水平将增加，并且买主质量检查水平将减少。当它的期望的利润将减少时，与在买主产品质量检查水平，它的内部惩罚愿望增加，和供应商的改进，外部失败费用将也增加。因此，买主将设计一个刺激合同，哪个将增加的期望的利润，和整个供应链联合期望的利润功能可以成为反的U形状。最后，我们开发一个模拟例子并且在不对称的信息的条件下面在供应链为质量控制策略和合同设计建议建议。

简介：Socialmediaandconsumerbehaviorareincreasinglyimportantinbusinessnowadays.Asanewformofadvertising,socialmediadofacilitatetheincreaseindemandandbringachallengetomanufactures.Whileresearchersdemonstratedthatinsufficientcapacitygeneratesthelossintheprocessofsales,anoppositeconclusionhasbeenobtainedthattheprofitislargerininsufficientcapacity.Thisstudyinvestigatesthissituationofamanufacturer.Wedevelopamultiperiodmodelofinsufficientcapacityconcerningwithsocialmediaandconsumerbehavior.Ancalculationofthemodelindicatesthatagreatchangeappearsinthedemandofeachperiod.Toensurethemaximumprofit,thecapacityofeachperiodiscomputed.Andtheprofitisalmost8timeslargerthanthatwedonotconsidersocialmediaandconsumerbehavior.Wediscusstheimplicationsofourfindingsforboththeoryandpractice.

简介：Thispaperproposedtheoptimizedthree-stagestrategyoforderlymanagementoffilestreaminnetworkprintingworkflow.Infirststagethecustomerpreflightwasaddedtotheconventionalprepresspreflight,whichsetquick-type,general-type,stable-typeandcomprehensive-typepreflightschemeforcustomersbyinvestigatingthepossibilityofoccurrenceoferrorsofvariouspreflightentriesandcustomerrelevancy.Basedonfourtypesofpreflightschemes,fourcustomerpreflightapplicationswerecreatedbyusingPitstopProandConnectorYou.Customerscanselectoneoftheappropriateapplicationsforquickpreflightbeforedeliveringtoreducetheprobabilityofreturningthefilesbackforcorrectionwhenerrorsoccurinpreflight.Secondstageisprintingenterpriseprepresspreflight,whichproposedtheconceptoftheprepresspreflighttolerance.Inaddition,accordingtothedifferentrequirementsofprintingtechnologyandquality,thispaperestablishedtheprepresspreflightschemebasedontheprintingenterprises’toleranceforpreflighterror.Thirdstageistomanagetheoptimizedsortingofprepressfilestream.Toachieveit,theSPTruleandthe0-1programmingmodelwereadopted,timespendofpreflight,printingprocessandpost-pressfinishingwasalsotakenintoaccount.Moreover,EnfocusSwitchsoftwarewasappliedtoestablishautomatednetworkprintingworkflowandcompletethefilestreamsorting.Finally,theresultofsimulationanalysisoftheoptimizedstrategyshowsthattheoptimizedthree-stagestrategycaneffectivelyshortenthefileprocessingtime.

简介：Weinthispaperexaminewarrantystrategyinatwo-stagesupplychainconsistingofamanufacturerandtwocompetingretailers.Themanufacturerproducestwosubstituteproductsandmarketsthemthroughthetworetailerstoagroupofconsumers,respectively.Foreachtypeofproducts,themanufacturer’sbasewarrantyandaretailer’sextendedwarrantyarebundledwiththeproduct.Weusegametheoreticmodelstoexploretheinteractionsbetweenthetwotypesofwarrantiesandthecompetitionbetweentheretailers.Forthispurpose,twoscenariosareconsidered:noretailerandboththetworetailersprovidingtheextendedwarranties,respectively.Ineachscenario,themanufacturer’sbasewarrantiesareassumedtobeoffered.Ourresultsshowthatwhentheretailersoffertheirextendedwarranties,themanufacturerhasnoincentivetoofferthebasewarranties;otherwise,themanufacturerhastoprovidethebasewarranties.Thecompetitionbetweenretailersintermsoftheproductsubstitutabilityhasnoimpactonwarrantydecisions,butaffectsallplayers’profitsinthesupplychain.Themanufacturercanprovidealongerwarrantylengthandhighercustomerwelfaretoacustomerthantheretailersdo,ifitismoreefficientthantheretailersinwarrantycost-efficiency,andviceversa.

简介：Basedonthesystemtheory,thispaperdiscussesthestructureandefficiencyofagriculturallanduseinKaifengSuburban.Suchpresentproblemsasbenefitdeviationfromresourceallocation,distinguishedunemploymentandfourkindsofcontributionofurbanagriculturelandusearerevealed.Then,intheviewofsustainabledevelopment,someresolutionmeasurestotheproblemsareadvancedout.Thesesuggestionsincludefarmlandprotection,ecologicalagriculture,sustainablelanduseandinputdecreaseofsyntheticmatter.