简介:ThepapermodelsthearrivalofheterogeneousinformationduringR&DstagesasadoublystochasticPoissonprocess(DSPP).Thenewproductmarketintroductionisthoughtofasoptiononanoption(acompoundoption).ThispaperderivesananalyticapproximationvaluationformulafortheR&Doption,anddemonstratesthattheaccountsforheterogeneousinformationarrivalmayreducethepricingbiases.Thisway,thegapbetweenrealoptiontheoryandthepracticeofdecisionmakingwithrespecttoinvestmentinR&Disdiminished.
简介:WiththedeepeningofelectricpowermarketreforminChina,themonopolyedgeofthestate-ownedelectricpowerenterpriseswilllose.Onthebasisoftheexistingpostperformancesalarymechanism,ChinesepowerenterprisesneedtooptimizetheincentivemechanismofR&Dstaff,toarousetheR&Dstaff’senthusiasmandcreativity,toadapttothenewmarketcompetitionandfurtherimprovemarketvalue.WhilsttheincentivemechanismoptimizingprocessingneedstoconsidernotonlythechangingmarketenvironmentbutalsothepersonalandworkingcharacteristicsofR&Dstaff.ThispapersummarizesthecharacteristicsofthecurrentChinesepowerenterprises’R&Dstaff:staff’stheoryqualityishigh,butinsensitivetothemarket;theyareconfrontedwithheavyworkloadanddiversifiedjobchoices;managerscanobservetheirbehaviorchoicesornot;besides,theprocessofR&DiscomplexandthemarketreactionsofR&Dachievementsareuncertain.Basedonthepremiseoftheabovefeatures,twoincentivemodelsareestablishedinthispaperfromthepointofviewofenterprisemanagers.Oneisforthesituationwhenstaff’sbehaviorchoicescanbeobserved;theotherisforthesituationwhenstaff’sbehaviorchoicescannotbeobserved.Throughsolvingthemodel,weanalyzetheoptimizationpathofelectricpowerenterprisesR&Dstaffincentivemechanismundertheseconditions:(1)whenstaff’sbehaviorchoicescanbeobserved,managerscanpaymoretotheR&Dstaffwhodevelopproductswithhigheroutputvalue,inordertoencouragethemtoworkharder.(2)whenstaff’sbehaviorchoicescannotbeobserved,managersshouldtakereasonablestrategiesaccordingtothedifferentsituations:a.whenR&DstaffincentivetotallydependonthemarketvalueoftheR&Dachievements,managersshouldallocateworkloadrationallyaccordingtotheirdifferenttechnicallevels;b.whenthemarketreactionsofR&Dresultsbecomemoreprecarious,managersneedtoreducetheincentiveintensitywhichbasedonthemarketvalueandraisetheirfixe
简介:本文讨论了外商在大陆的R&D投资与中国自主创新的相互关系,及如何实现内外资R&D支出的平衡。近年来,中国的R&D投入迅速增长,科技实力不断增强。同时,随着跨国公司R&D全球化的迅猛发展,外资在中国的R&D投资影响日益扩大,研发经费占中国企业研发投入的比重达27%。在一些科技实力较强的国家,这一水平基本在30%左右。而科技实力最强大的美国和日本,这一比值更低,分别不超过15%和5%。因此,外资R&D的快速发展对中国自主创新战略提出了严峻挑战。本文在分析了近年来科技创新与外资R&D发展背景的基础上,着重讨论外资R&D在中国创新体系中的地位和作用,并封平衡外资与本土创新提出了政策建议。