简介:Thepaperdescribedthreemethodsofscalingthebondportfolioprice.Theywereduration,convexityandtimevalue.FromtheprincipleofNo-arbitrage,therewasoneandonlyonerelationshipofduration,convexityandtimevalue.ItchosethreecorporationbondsofChinaandanalyzedtheriskoftwoinvestmentstrategies.
简介:在生产工业的许多设备,公司不仅在产品价格上,而且在维护服务上与对方竞争。面向的公司为他们与维护服务(P&S捆)绑的顾客产品正在提供的越来越传统的产品。在这研究,我们检验公司刺激在市场由两家卖主垄断的局面与长期的维护或修理支持服务为顾客提供产品捆绑竞争环境。当提供P&S捆时,决定服务水平的坚挺的需要(以为在这份报纸的服务的平均反应时间保证)满足要求到提议和需要造一台服务设备处理维护。基于三个亚比赛模型的分析,我们描绘仅仅一个公司,两个公司或两个公司将在提供P&S捆的市场条件。最后,我们在公司策略选择上分析山猫的一种市场因素的affects。
简介:InthispaperwereanalyzeSaid’s(2011)workbyretainingallhisassumptionsexceptthatweusethefirst-priceauctiontoselldifferentiatedgoodstobuyersindynamicmarketsinsteadofthesecond-priceauction.Weconcludethatexceptfortheexpressionoftheequilibriumbiddingstrategy,alltheresultsforthefirst-priceauctionareexactlythesameasthecorrespondingonesforthesecond-priceauctionestablishedbySaid(2011).Thisimpliesthatthewell-known'revenueequivalencetheorem'holdstrueforSaid’s(2011)dynamicmodelsetting.
简介:Sponsoredsearchadvertisingisasignificantrevenuesourceforsearchengines.Toamelioraterevenues,searchenginesoftensetfixedorvariablereservepricetoininfluenceadvertisers'bidding.Thispaperstudiestheoptimalreservepriceforageneralizedsecond-priceauction(GSP)underbothstaticanddynamicsettings.Weshowthatifadvertisers'per-clickvaluehasanincreasinggeneralizedfailurerate,thesearchengine'srevenuerateisquasi-concaveandhencethereexistsanoptimalreservepriceunderbothsettings.DifferentfromastaticGSPauctionwheretheoptimalreservepriceisprovedtobeconstant,inadynamicsettingtheoptimalreservepriceisdependentonnotonlyadvertisers'per-clickvalues,butalsothenumberofadlinkssold.Asearchengineshouldgraduallyraisereservepriceasmorequalifiedadvertisersarrive,andmaintainthesamethresholdafterallfirst-pagepositionsareoccupied.
简介:底价拍卖是在传统的拍卖理论的热研究问题之一。这里,我们在联机拍卖学习开始的价格,在传统的拍卖的公共底价的对应物。由认为象eBay一样的三个特征联机,投标人(到泊松过程的题目)的auctions:stochastic入口,与开始的价格成正比的插入费用,和时间打折,我们为最大化分析了开始的价格的极值点的性质卖主期望了收入,并且发现了那,在某些条件下面,最佳的开始价格应该在最低许可的水平,它与从经典拍卖理论的结果相反并且事实上发现它的optimality。我们也开发了多级式的拍卖的一个一般扩大模型并且在它的性质上执行了分析。最后,为进一步的研究的一些方向也被提出。
简介:Afterthereformandopening,theeconomicrelationshipbetweenChinaandtheworldisstrengthenedheavily.Theoretically,internationalfactorshaveimpactonthedomesticgeneralpricelevelthroughasetofchannels.Thispaperemployedasampleincludingmonthlydataoffiverepresentativeindicators,toexploretheinfluenceofinternationalfactorsonChinesepricelevel.TheempiricalresultsshowedthatthereisanobviouslagforChineseCPIreactingtointernationalshocks,whilethePPIreactsimmediately.TheimpactofinternationalfactorsonChineseCPIandPPIusuallylasts12monthsatleastandtheyalwaysexhibitadifferenttransmissionmechanismforinternationalshocks.Besides,afurtherstudyrevealedthatsomestructure-breakpointsintheinfluencemechanismofinternationalfactorsexist,andgreatchangesoftheimpactdirectionandsignificancefordifferentfactorshavetakenplaceinthesubsampleperiods.
简介:ThemaineffectfactorofBeijingurbanpublictransportationticketpricesystemfoundationisanalyzedbyapplyingsystemanalysismethod.Feasibleschemeofpublictransportationticketpricesyscemisproposed.3implementedschemeofpublictransportationticketpricesystemisvaluedbyapplyingfuzzymethod.
简介:Thepaperstudieschannelchoicedecisionsinamulti-channelsupplychainunderastrategywherethereisanex-antecommitmentmadeontheretailpricemarkup.Themarketdemandisuncertainanddependentonthepriceandsalesefforts.Theresultsshowthatinanychannelstructure,whenmakingorderdecisionstheretaileronlyexaminesthepriceratioandthefluctuationsizeofrandomdemand,ratherthanthechannelcostandtheretailer’smarketingefficiency.Whentheretailpricerises,themanufactureriswillingtoincreaseinventoryquantityfordirectsales,becausethemanufacturer’sprofitmarginishigherindirectchannel.Theincreaseindemandfluctuationonlyaffectsthedegreeofchannelpreferencebutdoesn’tchangethemanufacturer’schannelchoice.Nomatterinwhichlevelthepriceratiois,whenthesalesefficiencyofretailchannelisnothighorthedemandproportionofdirectchannelislow,themanufacturerandtheretailerwillbebothapttochooseadual-channelstructure.Thenaddingadirectchannelbecomesamarketingstrategy,ratherthanacompetitoroftheretailchannel,andhelpsthesupplychainwinmoremarketdemand.
简介:Weconsideranewsvendorproblemwithprice-dependentdemand,ineitheradditiveormultiplicativeformat.Thenewsvendorhastwomodesofpurchasing:regularorderingatthebeginningofthesellingseasonandemergencyordering(iftherealizeddemandexceedstheinitialorderquantity)attheendofthesellingseason.Bystochasticcomparisons,wesystematicallyinvestigatetheeffectsofdemandmagnitudeanddemandrandomnessonpricingandorderingquantitydecisionsaswellasexpectedprofitofthenewsvendor,underbothusualstochasticorder(firstorderstochasticdominance)andconvexorder(lessvariable).Ourkeyfindingsinclude:(i)incontrarytothecasewherepriceisexogenous,astochasticallylargerdemandshockmayevenleadtoalowerorderquantity;(ii)astochasticallylargerdemandshockleadstoahigherpricefortheadditivedemandcase,butmayleadtoalowerpriceforthemultiplicativedemandcase;(iii)astochasticallylargerdemandshockleadstoahigherexpectedprofitforbothdemandmodels;(iv)ingeneral,alessvariabledemandleadstoahigherexpectedprofitforbothdemandmodels;andfurthermore,alessvariabledemandshockhasnoeffectonpricefortheadditivedemandmodel,butleadstoahigherpriceforthemultiplicativedemandmodel.Theimplicationsofallthesefindingsforpricingandorderquantityarediscussedindetail.
简介:Intheexistingelectricitymarket,thetraditionalpowersuppliersandrenewableenergygeneratorscoexistinthepowersupplyside.Inthepowersupplyside,renewableenergygeneratorsgeneratepowerbywindandothernaturalconditions,leadingrenewableenergyoutputacertainrandomness.However,thelowmarginalgeneratingcostandthereductionofcarbonemissions,andthusbringsacertainadvantageforrenewableenergycomparedtoalternativeenergy.Electricity,asaspecialcommodity,stableandadequatepowersupplyisanecessaryguaranteeforeconomicandsocialdevelopment.Powershortagesituationisnotallowedinthepowersystem,andtheextrapowerneedstobehandledforthepurposeofsafety.Inthispaper,thehybridpowergeneratedbyrenewableenergygeneratorsandtraditionalenergygeneratorsisusedaspowersupply,andthentheelectricitymarketsellshybridpowertoelectricityconsumers,thehybridpowersystemdeterminestheoptimaldaytimeprice,nighttimeprice,andtheoptimalinstalledcapacityoftherenewableenergysuppliers.Wefindthattheinstalledcapacityofrenewableenergyincreasesfirstandthendecreaseswiththeincreaseofthepricesensitivitycoefficientoftraditionalenergysupply.Electricitydemandisnegativelyrelatedtoelectricitypriceinthecurrentperiod,andispositivelyrelatedtopriceintheotherperiod.Theaveragepriceofdayandnightisonlyrelatedtothetotalpotentialdemandofdayandnightandthetotalgenerationprobabilityofrenewableenergy.Thepricedifferencebetweendaytimeandnighttimeispositivelyrelatedtopotentialelectricitydemand,andnegativelyrelatedtothesensitivitycoefficientofelectricityprice.
简介:Inthispaper,westudyacentralizedsupplychainforatwo-stagewithsellingpricediscount.Thissupplychainconsistsofasupplierandaretailer.Basedonthefeaturethattheproduct’ssellingseasonisshortandthesupplychainfacesgreatdemanduncertainty.Weconsideratwo-stagescenariowhere,atthebeginningofstage1,thesupplierreservesproductioncapacitybasedonhistoricdatainadvance,stage2comestousaftersomeleadtime,boththesupplierandtheretailerupdatethedemandinformation,theretailerthenplacesanordernotexceedingthereservedcapacitybasedontheselling-pricingdiscountdependentdemand.Wemakeoptimaldecisionsonthereservedcapacityinstage1,sellingpricediscountandorderquantityinstage2.Inthissupplychain,thepatterninstage2isfiguredoutfirst,andthenstage1isclearedaswell.Thenwepresentanumericalexampletogivesomeinsights.Finallywegetsomeconclusions.
简介:Duetothelongoperationcycleofmaritimetransportationandfrequentfluctuationsofthebunkerfuelprice,therefuelingexpenditureofacharteredshipatdifferenttimeorportsofcallmakesignificantdifference.Fromtheperspectiveofshippingcompany,anoptimalsetofrefuelingschemesforashipfleetoperatingondifferentvoyagecharterroutesisanimportantdecision.Toaddressthisissue,thispaperpresentsanapproachtooptimizetherefuelingschemeandtheshipdeploymentsimultaneouslywithconsideringthetrendoffuelpricefluctuations.Firstly,anARMAmodelisappliedtoforecastatimeserialsofthefuelprices.Thenamixed-integernonlinearprogrammingmodelisproposedtomaximizetotaloperatingprofitoftheshippingcompany.Finally,acasestudyonachartercompanywiththreebulkcarriersandthreevoyagecharterroutesisconducted.Theresultsshowthattheoptimalsolutionsavesthecostof437,900USDcomparedwiththetraditionalrefuelingscheme,andverifytherationalityandvalidityofthemodel.
简介:Inthispaper,weconsideranewsvendormodelinwhicharisk-aversemanagerfacesastochasticprice-dependentdemandineitheranadditiveoramultiplicativeform.Anemergencypurchaseoptionisallowedaftertherealizationofdemandtosatisfytheunitsthatareshort.Byadoptingconditionalvalue-at-risk(CVaR)asthedecisioncriterion,weaimtoinvestigatetheoptimalpricingandorderingdecisions,andtheeffectsofparameterchangesinsuchasetting.Weprovidesufficientconditionsfortheuniquenessoftheoptimalpolicyforbothdemandmodels.Weperformcomparativestaticsanalysistoshowhowtheoptimalpricingandorderingdecisionbehaveswhenchangingparameters.WealsocompareourresultswiththoseofthenewsvendorwithageneralutilityfunctionandwithCVaRcriterionunderlostsalesassumption.Ourkeyresultsinclude:(i)Forbothdemandmodels,theoptimalsellingpriceisdecreasinginriskaversion.Hence,theoptimalpriceofarisk-aversenewsvendorisnotgreaterthantheoptimalpriceofarisk-neutralnewsvendor.(ii)Incontrarytothelostsalescase,forthemultiplicativedemandmodel,theoptimalorderquantitymaynotbemonotonicinriskaversion.Consequently,theoptimalrisk-averseorderquantitymaybelowerorhigherthantheoptimalrisk-neutralcounterpart.(iii)Fortheadditivemodel,theoptimalorderquantityisstrictlyincreasingintheemergencypurchaseprice,whileforthemultiplicativemodeltheoptimalorderquantityhasnosuchamonotonicproperty.Somenumericalexamplesareconductedtoverifyourclaimsandgainmoreinsightsabouttherisk-aversedecision-makingbehaviors.
简介:Retailpriceandpromotionaleffortaretwoimportantparametersonwhichdemandofacommoditylargelydepends.Thispaperdevelopsandanalyzesatwo-echelonsupplychainwheremarketdemanddependsonbothretailpriceandsaleseffort.Thecentralizedmodelisstudiedasthebenchmarkcase,andthewholesaleprice-onlycontractisstudiedasthebasecaseinwhicheachentitytriestomaximizeitsindividualprofit.Differentcontractmechanismsareimplementedtooutperformthebasecaseintermsofbothtotalchain'saswellasindividualprofits.Comparisonsamongthecoordinatingcontractsareprovidedsothatanyentitymaychoosethebetteronefromavailablecontractsafterthecontractparametersarenegotiated.Themodelisextensivelyexaminedthroughanumericalexample.