简介：Thepaperanalyzestheinfluenceofleadtoxicitybyanaerobicgranulesludgeinhibitionandrecoveringexperiments.Theresultshowsthattherearedifferentinhibitiontypesatdiffer-entleadcontents.Higherleadcontentleadstomoreinhibitiongranularsludge,andatthesametime,thetimeofgasrecoveryisdifferent.Lowerleadcontentpermicroorganismresultsinsoonersludgerecovery.Microorganismshaveagoodabilitytoresistleadtoxicity.

简介：1BACKGROUNDOFTHETASKFORCEOFCIRCULARECONOMYInrespondingtothecallfromtheChinesegovernmenttotakethecirculareconomyapproachfornewindustrializationandsustainabledevelopment,theTaskForceonCircularEconomy&CleanerProduction(CETF)ofthe3rdphase

简介：Globalmitigativeandadaptiveeffortshavenotbeenabletoeffectivelyaddresstheadverseimpactscausedbyclimatechange.Therefore,adirectsolutionisneededtoaddressthesignificantresultinglossanddamage(L&D).DuringtheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChangeheldinDohain2012,theissueofrespondingtoL&Darisingfromclimatechangegainedsuddentractionandbecameoneofthekeyissuesthataffectedtheoutcomeoftheconvention.Inthispaper,astudyonthedefinitionandconnotationsofL&Darisingfromclimatechangewasconducted,togetherwithananalysisofitsrelationshipwithrelatedconcepts,namelyimpacts,vulnerability,andrisks.ThisledtotheproposalofanL&Dconceptualmodelthatismorecomprehensive,withtherecognitionoftheneedtoaddresstheissuethrougheffectivesupplementationofexistingmitigativeandadaptiveefforts.AsystematicelaborationofanL&Dresponsemechanismwasmadebasedonpolitics,law,andthemarket,leadingtoapreliminarypresentationofapossibleformatforanL&Dmechanism.PotentialacademicresearchdirectionsforL&DwerealsoproposedthatcouldserveasreferencesfortheestablishmentofinternationalandnationalL&Dresponsemechanismsandrelatedresearch.

简介：Ecologicalcityistheadvancedmodeofharmoniousdevelopmentofcity.Constantimprovementisbeingmadeinthedevelopmentofecologicalcity.However,buildingecologicalcityisanenormousprojectthatcallsforahugeamountofcapital.Thegovernmentfundisfarfromadequate.Thispaperprobesintothefundissueanddiscussesindetailthemechanismofinvestmentandfinancinginbuildingecologicalcityfromvariousaspectssuchasdiversificationoftheinvestmentsubjectsandthemodesoffinancing.

简介：Indespiteoffluctuationinrecentyears,thegrainyieldinChinahasbeenincreasing,whichrelievestheconflictbetweensupplyanddemandandturnsthesituationoffoodsecuritygood.However,becauseoftherapidincreaseinfoodconsumption,theconflictsoffoodqualityandstructureinthesupplyanddemandequilibriumhasbecomemoreandmoreobviousandthelong-effectivemechanismoffoodsecurityhasnotbeenestab-lishedyet.ItisfoundthatthefactorsaffectingfoodsecurityinChinaincludethescarcityanddissipationofresources,farmers’lowenthusiasminplantinggraincropsandtheinappropriatenessoftheemphasisandmeasuresofmacro-economicregulationandcontrol.Therefore,theauthorsadvancetooptimizeresourcesallocation,strengthenmacro-economicregulationandcontrolandpolicystimulationandestablishthemechanismofallocatinggrainproductioncost,tosetupthelong-effectivemechanismofChinafoodsecurityandkeepitstableinthelongterm.

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简介：TheproblemofwaterresourceshasbecomeabottleneckforthesustainabledevelopmentofBeijingandHebeiProvince(thetworegionstogetherarecalled"JingjiRegion"forshort).Itisimperativetoestablishaneffectiveandequitablewaterresourcesecologicalcompensation(eco-compensation)mechanism.Thethreestagesofwaterresourceseco-compensationareexpatiatedherenamelytheeco-compensationmissingstage,ecocompensationstartstageandtheeco-compensationdevelopmentstage.Throughtheestablishmentofeco-compensationgamemodelbasedonthegametheory,thereasonsoftheformationforthethreestageswereanalyzed,aswellastheconversionconditionsfromnon-cooperativegametocooperativegameamongtherelatedstakeholdersincludingthecentralgovernment,thewaterrecipientgovernmentandthewatersourcegovernment.Furthermore,thisstudypointedoutthatthewaterresourceseco-compensationinJingjiRegionwasnotestablishedbasedontheinstitution,butformedanddevelopedincopingwiththechallengesofwatercrisis.However,institutionconstructionisquiteessentialingameprocessforthewaterrecipientgovernmentandthewatersourcegovernment.Finallyrecommendationsinfourareasincludinglegalizationofeco-compensationmechanism,settingupcompensationstandards,leadingindustrialupgradinganddevelopingrelatedincentivesandconstraintswereconcluded.

简介：Inordertomakefurtherstepsindealingwithclimatechange,Chinaproposedtopeakcarbondioxideemissionsbyabout2030andtomakebesteffortsforthepeakingearly.Thecarbonemissionpeaktarget(CEPT)mustresultinaforcingmechanismonChina’seconomictransition.Thispaper,byfollowingthelogicalorderfrom'researchoncarbonemissionhistory'to'carbonemissiontrendprediction,'from'researchonpathsofrealizingpeak'to'peakrestraintresearch,'providesageneralreviewofcurrentstatusanddevelopmenttrendofresearchesonChina’scarbonemissionanditspeakvalue.Furthermore,thispaperalsoreviewsthebasictheoriesandspecificcasesoftheforcingmechanism.Basedontheexistingachievementsanddevelopmenttrendsinthisfield,thefollowingresearchdirectionsthatcanbefurtherexpandedareputforward.First,fromtheperspectiveoflong-termstrategyofsustainabledevelopment,weshouldanalyzeandconstructtheforcingmechanismofCEPTinareversethinkingway.Second,economictransitionpathsundertheforcingmechanismshouldbesystematicallystudied.Third,byconstructingalarge-scalepolicyevaluationmodel,theemissionreductionperformanceandeconomicimpactofaseriesofpolicymeasuresadoptedduringthetransitionprocessshouldbequantitativelyevaluated.

简介：Companiesbearprimaryresponsibilityforlow-carboneconomy,thusrelevantlow-carbonpoliciesshouldbesetproperlytoguidethemandtoensuretheirlow-carbonproductioneffectively.Tosolvetheproblemsgeneratedduringlow-carbondevelopment,thisarticleverifiestheexistenceofthetransmissionpathandstrength.Thisverificationincludesmediatingvariablesofcompanies’willingnessandcapacitytoconductlow-carbonproduction,atransmissionmechanismthroughincentivepathandresourcesprotection,andquestionnairedataofagriculturalcompanies.Conclusionsshowthatthelowcarbonpolicieshaveobviouspositiveeffectsonwillingnessofcorporation;thebasicservice-orientedpolicyhasasignificantlypromotingeffectonlow-carbonproductioncapacity;andlow-carbonproductionperformanceispositivelyinfluencedbywillingnessaswellascapability.Aimingatabettertransmissionpath,somecorrespondingrecommendationshavebeenputforwardintheend.

简介：Whileanalyzingoverallplanningandcoordinateddevelopmentofurban-ruralareas,thispapershowsthatoverallplanningforthedevelopmentofurban-ruralareasisarequirementforthebestuseofproductiveforces.Itmeansthesettingupofapolicymechanismforcoordinatedgrowth.Recognizingthis,thegovernmentshouldsetupawaytoleadandmanageaunifiedprogramtoincreaseserviceanddecreasecontrollingadministrationpower,whilesafeguardingandfulfillingthefarmers'ownershiptothemeansofproduction.

简介：ThispaperanalyzesthethreemainfundamentalissuesinthedesignofChina’sETSpilots,includingallowanceallocation,pricemechanismandstate-ownedkeyenterprises,andproposedsuggestedsolutions.Fortheissueofallowanceallocation,wesuggestthatthegradualhybridmodecouldbeappliedatthebeginning,whichstartswithmainlyfreeallocationandthenincreasesauctionratiogradually.Andgrandfatheringisasuitablemethodoffreeallocation.Fortheissueofpricemechanism,wesuggestapricefloatingzonewithopenmarketoperationtoreducetheuncertaintyofprices.Fortheissueofstate-ownedkeyenterprises,wesuggestagoodcoordinationwithSASAC,definingthestate-ownedpropertyrightandsupervisionrightwhenstate-ownedkeyenterprisesareinvolvedintothecarbonmarket,andthelocalgovernmentcansetrulesofallocationandtransactiontolimittheirpotentialmarketpower.

简介：Thispaperpresentsresultsoftheassessmentonbenefitsharingandpaymentmechanismstestedbysixnon-governmentalorganizations(NGOs)-pilotedReducingEmissionsfromDeforestationandForestDegradation(REDD+)initiativesinTanzania.ResultsfromtheassessmentindicatethatmodelsappliedbymostoftheREDD+pilotprojectshaveprovidedmostofdecisionsforthedistributionofbenefitstothecommunitiesthroughvillagegeneralassemblies.Basedonrequirementsofthetestedmodels,nationalbenefit-sharingmechanismmodelsareproposed.Majorattributestobeconsideredinthedevelopmentofnationalbenefit-sharingmodelsshouldinclude:(i)ensuringthattheexistinggovernmentstructureisnotexcludedtoensuresustainability;(ii)villagegeneralassemblyisinvolvedindeterminingthedistributionofthebenefitsaccrued;and(iii)transparencyinhandlingthecarbonfinanceisensured.ModelsthatareproposedforthenationalREDD+benefitsharingapplytotwoforestmanagementsystems,namelyJointForestManagement(JFM)andCommunityBasedForestManagement(CBFM).ThepaperrecommendstestingofthetwoproposedmodelstodeterminewhethertheycouldbeusefulinsharingbenefitsresultingfromREDD+inTanzania.