简介:Inthispaper,agamemodelcomposedofthreesubjects—government,manufacturerandconsumerhasbeenbuiltbyusingEvolutionaryGameTheoryonthebasisofanalyzingthetrilateralgamestrategyofwastemobilereversesupplychainbasedonECP;anevolutionaryequilibriummodelistobesoughtforbyutilizingthereplicationdynamicdifferentialequationmethod;andthetrilateralgamestrategy’srevolutionarytrendandconsistencyhavebeenanalyzedbymeansofSDsimulationmethodwhengovernmentimplementsthestaticordynamicrewardandpunishmentstrategy.Thefindingresultsrevealthat,underthestaticrewardandpunishmentstrategy,therevolutionaryprocessoftrilateralgamestrategyisalwaysunstablewhethertheinitialbehaviorstrategyisunitaryormixed.Therefore,itismorereasonableforthegovernmenttoadoptthestrategyofdynamicrewardandpunishment,anditisalsostableandreciprocalforallthestakeholderswhenimplementingthisstrategy.