Thispaperfirstlyextendsthesingleperiodforestoptimalharvestingdecisionmodeltoinfiniteperiods,inordertoindicatehowtodeterminetheoptimalrotationperiodaimedatmaximizingforestrevenueinalldirectionswhenrepeatplantingandharvestingtreesonthesameplotofearthtillinfinitefuture.Thestudyalsoanalyzestheinfluenceofdiscountedrates,timberprice,harvestingcosts,plantingcosts,andtaxonthedeterminationofoptimalrotationperiod;andhowtheoptimalrotationperiodwillchangewhenweintroducethefactorsofcontinuouslyrisingtimberpriceandecologicalrevenue.Secondly,theauthorsintroducetheintergenerationalequityprincipleintotheabovemodeltodesignaresource-exploitingmodewhichsatisfiesbomthedynamicefficiencyprincipleandtheintergenerationalequityprinciple.Lastbutnotleast,theresearchappliestheabovemodeltotheanalysisofChineseforestryeconomicpolicyandexplainstheeconomictheoryofinstitutionssuchasGovernmentPurchasingEcologicalForest,TreeCompensation,andForestrySubsidization,whichprovidesanecessarytheoreticalfoundationforfutureapplicationofthesenewinstitutions.Besides,inregardtomistheoreticalframework,theauthorsanalyzethenecessityoftheNaturalForestProtectionandGrainforGreenprojectswhicharecurrentlybeingimplementedinChina.Wealsopointouttheemphasisofworktoinsuretheprojectsustainableandsuccessful.Finally,theresearchdiscussestheenterprise’sincentivetoover-the-quotaharvestingandthegovernment’smeansofrestrictingsuchbehavior,whichhighlightsthefactmatimprovedsupervisionandhigherpenaltiesarehelpfulinrestrictingover-the-quotaharvesting.
